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What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of Assisted
Reproductive Technology
CATHERINE A. CLEMENTS*

INTRODUCTION

Sitting in rush-hour traffic, I hear a radio commercial for a local hospital.
Quadruplets were born, it says, premature, after the mother was on hospitalized bed
rest for several weeks. The radio commercial urges listeners to visit the hospital's Web
site to "see how the story turned out." A review of the Web site reveals that the
quadruplets have survived and are developing well despite their prematurity.' Further
investigation reveals that the quadruplets were born because their mother used fertility
drugs.2 Prematurity is one of the adverse outcomes that users of assisted reproductive
technology (ART) might expect, and not all ART stories have happy endings.
In 1978, the first "test-tube" baby was born.4 This birth, the first to result from the
use of in vitro fertilization (IVF), ushered in an era of new reproductive choices for
infertile parents. Since that first birth, the use of assisted reproduction has grown
dramatically. In 2005, fertility clinics registered with the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) s performed 134,260 ART cycles,6 which resulted in 38,910 live

* J.D. Candidate 2009, Indiana University Maurer School of Law- Bloomington; B.A.
Music/B.S. Psychology 1996, Indiana University; M.S. Education 2003, Indiana University. I
would like to thank my husband, Jay Barbus, and my daughter, Emily, for their incredible
patience and support.
1. The story of the quadruplets is labeled as a story of "tiny successes" on the St. Vincent
Hospital
Web
site.
Mystory.St.Vincent.org-Tiny
Successes
Quad
Story,
http://www.stvincent.org/MyStory/tinysuccesses/quad-story.htm; see also 4tunate: Everyday
Adventures with Extraordinary Boys, http://www.murraycrew.blogspot.com (the weblog for the
quadruplets).
2. Kristine Brite, Party of Six, HENDRICKS CoUNTY FLYER, Mar. 16, 2007, available at
http://www.flyergroup.com/local/local_story_075163531 .html.
3. For a discussion of the risks of ART and multiple births, see infra Part I.
4. Carol Lawson, CelebratedBirthAside, Teen-Ager is Typical Now, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1993, at A18. Louise Brown, the first test-tube baby, was created using in vitro fertilization
(IVF). Id. This technique involves a procedure in which doctors extract a woman's eggs,
fertilize them in the laboratory, and then transfer the fertilized eggs back into the uterus. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND

HuMAN

SERVS., 2005

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNoLOGY SuccEss RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY

CLINIC

REPORTS,

available

http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508CoverNational.pdf

at

[hereinafter

CDC 2005 ART REPORT].

5. Currently, there is no regulation of ART. Rather, fertility clinics can voluntarily report
their success rates to the CDC. The system is voluntary, and even the CDC acknowledges that
only 88.8% of clinics report to it. See CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, app. C. In
addition, no statistics are reported for experimental procedures. See FAQs: 2005 ART Report,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/faq.htm#8. There are no statistics on the clinics which choose
not to report, and there is no information on practices that may be performed by family doctors,
such as fertility drug use. CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supranote 4, at 3.
6. CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 11. According to the CDC, an ART cycle
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births and 52,041 infants.7
ART and fertility drugs provide something remarkable: an ability to control, or at
least overcome, nature. For infertile couples, 8 the ability to have a child is now within
the reach of science. However, newfound scientific power often comes with substantial
ethical and practical dilemmas, as seen in the current genetic cloning and embryonic
stem cell research debates. 9 Ethical and practical dilemmas swirl around ART. As the
limits on the right to procreation remain undefined, scientific advances often harm the
children eventually born, and the costs to the healthcare system go unchecked. Left
unregulated, ART is subject only to market forces (guided by parents desperate to have
children), the empty threat of tort liability, and the voluntary but self-interested
guidelines of physicians (who have profit and experimentation in mind). These forces
are not sufficient to safeguard society from the significant risks associated with the use
of ART.
This Note calls for federal regulation of ART and highlights the distinct groups
which have a stake in the ART process. These include the children eventually born
using ART, the would-be parents, and the public. 10 Children who are the products of
ART often suffer the consequences of risky and irresponsible practices. Meanwhile, the
fertility industry booms' and infertile parents go on a single-minded quest to have
12
biologically-related children without regard to the risks and in preference to adoption.
Broad disagreement over the dimensions of the procreative right prevents the oftendesperate, would-be parents from receiving meaningful guidance. Further, excessive
and irresponsible use of ART harms the public health.13 This Note proposes an
approach to regulation of ART that takes these interests into account.

starts when a woman starts taking drugs to stimulate egg production or begins ovarian
monitoring in anticipation of embryo transfer. The ART cycle then continues over a period of
about two weeks. See id. at 4.

7. Id. at 11. These infants accounted for more than one percent of U.S. births. CDC
Reproductive Health: ART Surveillance System, http://www.cdc.gov/Reproductive
Health/DRH/activities/ART.
8. Infertility is defined as lack of success after trying to conceive a child for one year. This
condition affects about ten percent of the population. See Resolve: The National Infertility
Association:
What
is
Infertility?,
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lm wii home. The CDC estimates that
"about 12% of women of childbearing age in the United States have used an infertility service."
CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
9. See Dena S.Davis, The Puzzle ofIVF, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 275,292 (2006);
Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 101, 103 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children ofART(AssistedReproductive Technology):
Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57 (2004); Helen M. Alvare,
The Casefor Regulating CollaborativeReproduction: A Children'sRights Perspective, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 1 (2003); Lars Noah, AssistedReproductive Technologiesandthe Pitfalls of

UnregulatedBiomedicalInnovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603 (2003); Lori B. Andrews & Nanette
Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35 (2000).
11. Alexander N. Hecht, Comment, The Wild Wild West: InadequateRegulation ofAssisted
Reproductive Technology, I Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 227, 229 (2001).
12. See MAuRA A. RYAN, THE ETHIcs AND ECONOMICS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE
COST OF LONGING 70-74 (2001).
13. See infra Part IV.
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In order to introduce the issues and tensions inherent inany discussion of assisted
reproduction, I will first provide an overview of assisted reproduction and its risks.
Parts II, III, and IV will discuss how the use of ART affects the interests of the
children, the parents, and the public. Finally, in Part V, I will discuss the current
regulatory scheme for ART. I argue in this Note that federal regulation may be the only
appropriate solution to the ethical dilemmas presented by the use of ART. Despite
widespread debate on the extent of the right to reproduce, 14 the harm caused to future
children by risky ART practices is entirely preventable and should be avoided. The
children born from the use of ART, their parents, and the public will benefit from a
regulatory scheme that takes their interests into account.

I.

OVERVIEW OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND ITS RISKS

15

Couples suffering from infertility have a wide variety of options if they choose to
utilize ART. These include artificial insemination, 16 fertility drugs, 17 IVF,'8
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI),' 9 gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT),20
zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), 2' use of a donor egg, or often a combination of
22
techniques.

14. CompareJohn A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L.
& MED. 439,447 (2003) (defining procreative liberty broadly), with Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking
the ProcreativeRight, 10 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 1, 63 (2007) (proposing a narrower
definition of procreative liberty).
15. Infertile couples have many options for expanding their families in addition to assisted
reproduction. Adoption, for example, is one viable way for couples to create a family. Many
couples choose this method, and federal and state laws and regulations ensure careful screening
of parents. Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of ProspectiveParenthood: In Pursuit of the
ProperStandardforGatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDozO L. REV. 2283, 2294 (2007).
However, adoption is "considered a second-best alternative for intended parents who are left
with no other choices." Rosato, supra note 10, at 70. By contrast, ART is not regulated.
Collaborative reproduction, another option for infertile couples, involves use of third-party
genetic material. The Uniform Parentage Act has attempted to provide a guideline for dealing
with the legal issues surrounding this type of reproduction. See generallyUNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
9B U.L.A. (2000).
16. Artificial insemination involves the use of either the partner's sperm or donor sperm
that is injected into the woman in the hopes of becoming pregnant. ROBERT G. EDWARDS &
STEVEN A. BRODY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED HuMAN REPRODUCTION 13-15

(1995).
17. With use of drugs that boost egg production, a woman increases her chances of
becoming pregnant. Id.
18. IVF is the classic "test-tube baby" procedure, in which a woman's eggs are extracted,
fertilized in the laboratory, and then transferred back into the uterus. CDC 2005 ART REPORT,
supra note 4, at 3.
19. ICSI is a special technique used in IVF in which a single sperm is injected directly into
the egg. Id.
20. GIFT involves transferring unfertilized eggs and sperm into the woman's fallopian
tubes through small incisions in the abdomen. Id.
21. ZIFT is performed in much the same way as GIFT, but in ZIFT the woman's eggs are
fertilized in the laboratory and then transferred into her fallopian tubes. Id.
22. EDWARDS & BRODY, supra note 16, at 13-15.
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According to the CDC, which employs a limited definition of ART 23 and reports
statistics on only those clinics participating in a voluntary reporting scheme,24 the
overall success rate25 for couples using ART was less than fifty percent.26
Assisted reproduction is risky, both for mothers-to-be and for their unborn children.
Eighteen percent of ART-induced pregnancies have an adverse outcome such as
miscarriage, abortion, or stillbirth.27 Risks to the fetus include prematurity and birth
defects. 28 Birth deetar
defects are roughly twice as prevalent among children bom using ART
than they are among naturally conceived children.29 Children born from ART are at a
greater risk for preterm birth than infants in the general population. 30 The risks of
prematurity include mortality, mental retardation, visual and hearing impairments,
learning disabilities, and behavioral and emotional problems throughout life. 3321
Additional risks ofprematurity include neurological disorders such as cerebral palsy.
Pregnancy resulting in multiple births is also a common risk associated with the use
of ART. Among clinics reporting to the CDC in 2005, approximately thirty-two
percent of all ART-induced births resulted in multiple infants (twins, triplets, or
more),33 compared with a multiple-infant birth rate in the general U.S. population of
just over three percent. 34 Multi-fetal pregnancy carries with it significant risks for
newborns, including low birth weight and prematurity.35 Multi-fetal pregnancy can also

23. The CDC definition of ART only includes procedures inwhich both eggs and sperm are
handled. CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
24. Id. at app. C.
25. The CDC defines success in six different ways, but each definition measures success in
terms of rates of pregnancies or live births. See id. at 19.
26. See id. at 20. The overall clinical pregnancy rate for couples receiving treatment at
CDC-reporting clinics was thirty-four percent.
27. Id at 21.
28. Jane R. W. Fisher, Karin Hammarberg, & Gordon Baker, Assisted ConceptionIs a Risk
Factorfor PostnatalMood Disturbance and Early ParentingDifficulties, 84 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 426 (2005); Noah, supra note 10.
29. Michele Hansen, Jennifer J. Kurinczuk, Carol Bower, & Sandra Webb, The Risk of
Major Birth Defects After IntracytoplasmicSperm Injection andin Vitro Fertilization,346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 725, 729 (2002).
30. According to the CDC, preterm birth occurs when a baby is born before thirty-seven
weeks of pregnancy. CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supranote 4, at 23.
31. Contribution ofAssisted Reproductive Technology and Ovulation-InducingDrugs to
Triple and Higher-Order Multiple Births-United States, 1980-1997, 49 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 535, 536 (2000) [hereinafter CDC: Contributionto Multiple Births].
32. B. Stromberg, G. Dahlquist, A. Ericson, 0. Finnstrom, M. Koster, & K. Stjernqvist,
NeurologicalSequelae in ChildrenBorn After in- Vitro Fertilisation:A Population-BasedStudy,
359 LANCET 461, 464 (2002).
33. See CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
34. Id.at 22. At least one study has found that ART contributed to approximately 43.3% of
the triplet and higher-order multiple births in 1997. CDC: Contribution to Multiple Births,
supra note 31, at 535.
35. Siddharth Khanijou, Multifetal Reduction in Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A
License to Kill?, 8 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L. 403, 408-09 (2005); see also, e.g., Nanette
Elster, Less Is More: The Risks ofMultiple Births, 74 FERTILITY & STERILrrY 617, 618 (2000)
(detailing the medical complications that arise from the often-premature births of multiples).
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result in too many pregnancies to be viable, 36 leading some practitioners and patients to
elect fetal reduction as a way to preserve the health of the mother and the remaining
fetuses.37 Some parents refuse to undergo this procedure, with mixed results.38
The use of ovulation stimulation hormones is also associated with a higher rate of
multiple pregnancies and the attendant serious complications.39 One observational
study concluded that while physicians have made inroads into controlling multiple
births resulting from the use of IVF and GIFT, rates of multiples resulting from the use
of ovulation stimulation drugs have remained the same. 4° Further, all physicians can
prescribe fertility drugs-there are no restrictions. 41 The use of fertility drugs is thus

36. Khanijou, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Dateline:After 10 Years, New Adventures for Septuplets (NBC television broadcast

Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22223331/ [hereinafter Dateline:McCaughey].
Most famously, the parents of the McCaughey septuplets refused fetal reduction on religious
grounds. The septuplets, born in 1997, survived and are now ten years old. Id. Before the
McCaugheys, however, there were the Frustaci septuplets, whose parents also refused fetal
reduction. GREGORY E. PENCE, CLAssIC CASES INMEDICAL ETHICs: ACCOUNTS OF THE CASES AND
ISSUES THAT DEFINE MEDICAL ETHICS 113 (5th ed. 2008). One of the seven babies was stillborn
and three others died shortly after birth in 1987. The remaining three children were diagnosed
with cerebral palsy and mental retardation. The Frustacis sued the fertility clinic and the maker
of the fertility drug that they used and received a $2.7 million settlement. Septuplets Heartache:
The
Frustaci
Story,
CNN.coM,
Nov.
20,
1997,
http://www.cnn.com/US/9711/20/septuplets.frustaci/index.html.
39. See Rosato, supra note 10, at 60; Noah, supra note 10, at 628-30. For example, one
fertility drug, known as Repronex®, lists the risk of multiple pregnancy as a warning on its
package
insert.
Ferring
Pharmaceuticals,
Repronex®
Package
Insert,
http://www.ferringusa.com/fertilityproducts/insertrepronex.htm. The multiple births resulting
from the use of fertility drugs are celebrated in the popular media. Recently, the front page of
the IndianapolisStar celebrated the homecoming of the Manley quintuplets, born after their
mother took fertility drugs. Dana Knight, Five-FoldBlessing: Large, Well-OrganizedChurch
FamilyIs Gearing Up to Help IndianapolisCouple Carefor Tiny Infants, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Jan. 5, 2008, at Al; see also Dateline:McCaughey,supra note 38 (discussing the McCaughey
septuplets); Khanijou, supra note 35, at 404 (live multiple births are often given significant
positive media attention, without much attention to negative outcomes that befall many of the
babies born as multiples).

40. Mark I. Evans, Linda Littmann, Lori St. Louis, Laurie LeBlanc, Jeanne Addis, Mark
Paul Johnson, & Kamran S. Moghissi, Evolving PatternsoflatrogenicMultifetal Pregnancy
Generation: Implicationsfor Aggressiveness of Infertility Treatments, 172 AM. J. OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 1750 (1995) ("Nevertheless, it is also abundantly clear that for a small group of
physicians and centers the use of ovulation-stimulating medications is very cavalier, with
reduction seen as a relatively unimportant side effect of aggressive infertility therapy."); see also
Rick Lyman, As Octuplets Remain in Peril,Ethics Questions Are Raised,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1998, at A22 (Issues of high-order multiple births "only come into play in procedures involving
these fertility drugs .... In those cases where in-vitro fertilization is used, under 10 percent of
all cases, the number of eggs implanted into the mother can be controlled.").
41. Lyman, supra note 40, at A22 (quoting Dr. Alan Copperman, Director of Reproductive
Endocrinology at Mt. Sinai-N.Y.U. Medical Center and Health System in New York). Indeed,
because of the decline in multiple births due to IVF and other procedures that can be controlled,
"gonadotropin stimulation is now a major cause of multiple gestation, especially high-order
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much more difficult to control than is the use of ART procedures such as IVF and
GIFT.
Multiple births have psychological consequences as well. These include a negative
psychological impact on the mother, as indicated by higher rates of depression, drug
and alcohol abuse, and divorce among mothers of multiples.42 Such negative impacts
on the mother naturally have an adverse impact on the children as well, and higher
rates of child abuse have been found in families of multiples.43
The use of ART poses serious, long-term mental and physical risks to both mothers
and children. Because the risks associated with ART are so significant, the government
cannot continue to leave regulation up to general market forces and simple voluntary
reporting requirements. In the discussion that follows, I outline three of the interests
affected by the use of ART: those of the children born from it, their parents, and the
public.
II. INTERESTS OF THE UNBORN CHILDREN
44
Children born through the use of ART are at risk of permanent health problems.
For the most part, however, scholars and courts have declined to see this possibility as
harm that can be remedied through tort liability.45 At the same time, states increasingly
criminalize risky behavior by pregnant women. 46 While they classify risky behavior
such as illicit drug use by pregnant women as harm, 47 policy makers and courts tend to
take a much less definitive stance on harm when parents and physicians make a
conscious decision to engage in risky ART procedures. 48 Meanwhile, fertility clinics
freely flourish in a market-driven, unregulated system.49 Although it is tempting to
believe that this freedom stems from deference to reproductive rights, the lack of
regulation in the fertility industry is probably due to the political influence of fertility
physicians and their patients.50 Tort liability remains the only check on fertility clinics'

multiple gestation (i.e. with triplets or more)." Siladitya Bhattacharya & Allan Templeton, In
Treating Infertility, Are Multiple Pregnancies Unavoidable?, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 58, 58
(2000).
42. Khanijou, supra note 35, at 410.
43. See Antoinette Martin, Multiple Births:A Wake-Up Call,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at 1
(linking multiple births to increased rates of child abuse).
44. See Hansen et al., supra note 29, at 725; Noah, supra note 10, at 622-23. See generally
Rosato, supra note 10, for an excellent discussion of the interests of the children born using
ART.
45. See, e.g., CHARLES P. KiNDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASsISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 267-74 (2006) (outlining
the current legal framework of harm cases); PAUL LAURHTZEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD: ETHICAL
ISSUES IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 41 (1993) (explaining the "nonidentity problem" in
conceptualizing procreative harm).
46. See Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health Oriented
Responses to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 217, 220
(2001) (reviewing attempts by different states to criminalize risky behavior by pregnant women).

47. More than two-thirds of states have passed fetal protection statutes aimed at preventing
the harms caused by prenatal drug exposure. Id.
48. Davis, supra note 9, at 288; Dolgin, supra note 9, at 109.
49. See Hecht, supra note 11, at 229.
50. See Davis, supra note 9, at 288.
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freedom to engage in risky practices. And this threat is not a viable means of deterring
risky behavior on the part of ART physicians.
A. States "Protect" Unborn Childrenfrom Risky Behavior by Expectant Mothers

Legislative attempts to punish pregnant women for risky behaviors often have poor
outcomes. 5' Despite evidence that the legislature might discourage drug-addicted
pregnant women from seeking treatment for fear of prosecution, statutes that punish
such women represent part of a growing trend of punitive responses directed at
pregnant women who engage in risky behavior. 52 For example, Wisconsin enacted a
civil commitment statute that allows pregnant women to be taken into custody for
exhibiting a habitual lack of self-control with alcohol and controlled substances. 53 The
implications for pregnant women under these statutes are frightening. Because
pregnancy carries numerous risks, and because many behaviors on the part of the
pregnant woman can result in risks to the fetus, 54 such statutes carry with them a risk of
over-policing
pregnant women to ensure that they only engage in the healthiest
55
behaviors.
This legislative trend stands in stark contrast to the government's laissez-faire
approach toward ART, which allows practitioners and patients to engage in risky
techniques that carry serious consequences of harm. Indeed, Texas's Prenatal

51. See Linda C. Fentiman, The New "FetalProtection": The Wrong Answer to the Crisis
of InadequateHealth Carefor Women and Children,84 DENV. U. L. REv. 537, 541 (2006). In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court upheld a state hospital's procedure of
turning over drug testing results of pregnant women to law enforcement officials. 528 U.S. 1187
(2000).
52. This is indeed a growing trend, with some kind of fetal protection statute on the books
in at least two-thirds of states. Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 46, at 220. State legislative efforts
to address prenatal drug abuse can be categorized as either punitive or public health oriented.
Id.; see also Fentiman, supra note 51, at 594 (first arguing that punitive treatment of pregnant

women does not solve the problems related to poor prenatal healthcare and then proposing
solutions); Deanna Rae Reitman, Note, The CollisionBetween the Rights of Women, the Rights
of the Fetus and the Rights of the State: A CriticalAnalysis of the CriminalProsecutionofDrug
Addicted PregnantWomen, 16 ST. JOHN'S J.LEGAL COMMENT. 267,301-02 (2002) (suggesting
that criminal sanctions against pregnant women may result not only in subordination of women
but in more harm to the fetus); Shawn N. Randolph, Note, Pregnancyand the Criminalization
of PerinatalSubstance Abuse: Unethical, UnconstitutionalandPoorPublic Policy, 2 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 375, 391 (1992) (arguing that criminalization laws are ineffective
public policy); Robert Holland, Note, Criminal Sanctionsfor DrugAbuse During Pregnancy:
The Antithesis ofFetalHealth, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 415,458 (1991) (concluding that the

threat of criminal sanctions defeats the goal of fetal health).
53. WIs. STAT. § 48.193 (1999). The Wisconsin statute is undeniably broad.
54. A cursory overview of pregnancy recommendations from the expectant mother's most
popular guidebook includes prohibitions on such common-sense risks as alcohol, tobacco, and
drugs, as well as prohibitions on less well-known risks such as changing cat litter and eating
cold deli meat and peanuts. HEIDI MURKOFF, ARLENE EISENBERG & SANDEE HATHAWAY, WHAT
TO EXPECT WHEN YOU'RE EXPECTING 56-63,67, 151, 189 (3d ed. 2002).
55. Heather Flynn Bell, Comment, In UteroEndangermentandPublicHealth: Prosecution
vs. Treatment, 36 TULSA L.J. 649, 671-72 (2001).
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Protection Act specifically exempts from prosecution harm inflicted by fertility
treatments. 56 This Note does not argue that parents who use ART should be criminally
penalized. It argues that punishing pregnant women who engage in risky behaviors that
are indicative of poverty while refusing even to consider regulating the use of ART is
inconsistent. Rather, both groups of women (those who engage in "wealthy" risky
behaviors such as ART and those who engage in "poor" risky behaviors such as drug
abuse) would benefit from a comprehensive approach to women's health. In particular,
regulation of ART could improve outcomes for both the prospective mothers and their
future children, while public health initiatives that offer treatment, not punishment, to
drug-addicted pregnant women could likewise improve the outcomes for those mothers
and their future children.
B. Courts Are Reluctant to Classify ART-Related Injury as Harmfor the Purposes

of Tort Liability
The most common barrier to characterizing injuries caused by ART as harm for the
purposes of tort liability is the "nonidentity problem." 57 Simply, some commentators
view it as a logical impossibility that a person in existence would be better off if he had
never been born. 58 Under this view, a child born disabled due to complications of ART
was not harmed. Rather than arguing "but for the use of ART, I would be better off," a
child can only say, "but for the use of ART, I would not exist. '59 Courts have had great
difficulty in classifying this type of "wrongful life" as harm.60 Further, because

56. Michelle Haynes, Note, Inner Turmoil: Redefining the Individualand the Conflict of
Rights Between Woman andFetus Createdby the PrenatalProtectionAct, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REv. 131, 146 (2004).
57. LAURITZEN, supra note 45, at 41 (explaining the "nonidentity problem" in
conceptualizing procreative harm). But see Soren Holm, Wrongful Life, the Welfare Principle
and the Non-Identity Problem: Some FurtherConsiderations,in FIRST, Do No HARM: LAW,
ETHics AND HEALTHCARE 407, 419 (Sheila A. M. McLean ed. 2006) (arguing that the
nonidentity problem ignores questions of harm in the context of wrongful birth and wrongful
life claims); M.A. Roberts, SupernumeraryPregnancy, CollectiveHarm, andTwo Forms of the
Nonidentity Problem,34 J.L. MED. & ETucs 776, 776 (2006) (proposing a theory of harm that
includes children born from infertility treatment-induced supernumerary pregnancy); Rosato,
supra note 10, at 75 (suggesting that the ten percent of babies born disabled due to
complications of ART should be viewed as harmed by the procedures); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
HarmingFuturePersons: Obligations to the ChildrenofReproductive Technology, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDisc. L.J. 375, 384 (1999) (supporting a definition of harm that includes taking a risky
course of action when a safer one was available); Joshua Kleinfeld, Comment, Tort Law andln
Vitro Fertilization: The Need for Legal Recognition of "ProcreativeInjury", 115 YALE L.J.
237, 244 (2005) (arguing that the law should recognize a new category of tort liability for
procreative injury).
58. LAURITZEN, supra note

45.

59. See id.

60. KiNDREGAN & McBR1EN, supranote 45, at 270. However, as Philip G. Peters, Jr. notes,
"[t]he nonexistence comparison is most vulnerable to criticism whenever injuries associated
with a reproductive practice could be avoided by modifying that practice in a way that results in
the birth of a different (healthy) child." Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting the Unconceived:
Nonexistence, Avoidability, andReproductive Technology, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 487, 487 (1989).
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characterizing undesirable outcomes as harm means that parents and/or physicians
if
would be responsible for the harm, attempts to do so have been infrequent. 61 Indeed, 62
successful, these arguments would have "significant moral and legal implications,"
such as a necessary re-evaluation of the procedures used in ART. The courts should not
conduct such a re-evaluation, case by case, but rather, the legislature should enact
principled regulation addressing the legitimate interests of the child in the ART
process.
Tort liability alone is unlikely to produce adequate self-regulation. Although some
commentators and courts have called for a new category of tort liability in the assisted
reproduction context, 63 and a small number of courts have allowed children to sue their
mothers for prenatal injury, 64 it remains difficult to prove harm under traditional tort
definitions in the pregnancy/labor/delivery context.6 The unregulated nature of the
ART business has left the children born from ART unprotected from harm.66 It is fairly
clear, given the legal framework and the nonidentity problem discussed above, that
children born severely harmed from their parents' decision to undergo ART have a
difficult time recovering damages through the legal system.
III. INTERESTS OF THE WOULD-BE PARENTS
Parents who seek treatment for infertility naturally have an interest in the process,
and often the voices of the parents (who comprise the market for fertility services) are
the only voices heard. Although some scholars call for unfettered access to ART,67
there is no basis for treating the positive right to reproduce as fundamental.68 Indeed,

61. See KINDREGAN & McBRiEN, supra note 45, at 267 (stating that the case law dealing
with wrongful life claims is "slight"); Roberts, supra note 57, at 778 (proposing a theory of
harm that includes infertility treatment-induced supernumerary pregnancy); G.M. Adam,
Assisted Human Reproduction-LegalRights of the Unbornin Respect ofAvoidable Damage,
26 MED. & L. 325, 336 (2007) (arguing that ART should be regulated to be consistent with the

aims of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child).
62. Roberts, supra note 57, at 776.
63. Kleinfeld, supra note 57; see also Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 282 (N.Y. 1999)
(allowing a complaint for false and misleading business practices against IVF clinic when
plaintiffs failed to conceive).
64. See, e.g., Nat'l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86,87 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (allowing an insurance claim against a mother in the context of a motor vehicle
accident); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing a court to
consider whether a mother's ingestion of a drug while pregnant that discolored her son's teeth
was conduct rising to the level of tort liability); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 466 (N.H. 1992)
(recognizing a cause of action by a child against a mother for negligently crossing the street
while pregnant).
65. Noah, supra note 10, at 634.
66. Rosato, supra note 10, at 59-60 (arguing that children born from ART are at risk of
serious harm). "The market rules and no one in the entire contracting process speaks for the
future child." Id. at 62 (quoting George J. Annas, Human Cloning:A Choiceor an Echo?, 23 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 247, 262 (1998)).
67. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers,
IndelibleHarms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 23 (2008); Robertson, supra note 14.
68. However, the negative right (the right not to reproduce) has been protected. See Casey
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the use of ART can be dangerous for the would-be parents, and the children eventually
born. 69 However, the extent of procreative liberty is not well-defined, 70 and there is no
unified feminist perspective on the use of ART.71 Finally, couples who seek out ART
may eventually divorce. When this happens, their interests often conflict.72 With such
disagreement and debate, the would-be parents are left with little guidance as they
attempt to determine how best to achieve their dreams of having children.
A. The UnclearDimensions of ProcreativeLiberty
The advent of ART has allowed many infertile couples to realize the dream of
having their own biological children, but it has also sparked debates about how far the
right to procreative freedom reaches. Espousing the modem traditionalist view of
procreative liberty, Professor Robertson has defined it as "a liberty or claim-right to
decide whether or not to reproduce. As such, it has two independently justified aspects:
the liberty to avoid having offspring and the liberty to have offspring.",73 Others have
echoed this broad view of procreative liberty. 74 Robertson and other commentators
base their views on the belief that a meaningful life depends on having one's own
biological children. 75 The medical establishment respects this view: "Couples suffering
from infertility are continually reminded of their situation ....
Simple tasks which we
take for granted become painful-almost every shop is stocked with goods for the baby
or young family; ... the infertile couple is excluded from this ritual. 76 As a legal
matter, courts and legislators have yet to determine the reach of the procreative right.
The Supreme Court has not considered a case in which the right to procreate via
assisted reproduction was at issue. Court doctrine extending the substantive due
process right of liberty to the reproductive context has thus far only addressed the right
not to procreate 77 or the right to procreate in the face of prohibitive laws. 78 Legal
commentators disagree as to whether the Supreme Court
would ever include a right to
79
procreate under its substantive due process doctrine.
v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
69. See supra Part I for a discussion of the risks associated with ART.
70. CompareRobertson, supra note 14, with Dillard, supra note 14.
71. Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and
Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 295, 308 (2005).

72. See infra Part III.C.
73. Robertson, supra note 14, at 447.
74. Daar, supra note 67, at 23 (advocating a view of procreation as a "basic human right");
Andrews & Elster, supra note 10, at 45 (stating that the "right to make reproductive decisions
includes the right of an infertile couple to utilize medically assisted reproduction ....
75. Robertson, supra note 14.
76. T. Appleton, An Ethical Approach to Counselling, in A TEXTBOOK OF ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION AND

IN VrrRo FERTIIZATION 417,417 (Peter R. Brinsden & Paul A. Rainsbury

eds., 1992).
77. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
78. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
79. See Dillard, supra note 14, at 18-19 (arguing that the privacy/autonomy line of
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Technology will continue to provide new and astounding ways for humans to
reproduce. Advances in reproductive technology provide wonderful opportunities for
prospective parents, but carry significant risks both to the mother and to the unborn
child. 80 The procreative right, therefore, has costs. These risks and costs point to the
need for some regulatory limits to ensure that science does not needlessly harm the
children born through ART or burden the public health system.
B. The FracturedFeministPerspective

The feminist perspective is fractured over the boundaries of the procreative right. 8'
Some feminists champion advances in reproductive technology because they provide
additional choices to women seeking to become pregnant,8 2 while other feminists view
the entire process of assisted reproduction as a means of placing additional
reproductive burdens on women. 83 Additionally, because regulations on assisted
reproduction vary widely around the world, the booming "fertility tourism" industry
has the potential to harm women as their bodies become commodities in the fertility
trade.84 And finally, other women's rights commentators are concerned with the
advances in reproductive technology that allow for sex selection and sex-selective
abortion. 85 The fractured nature of the feminist perspective on ART clouds debate over
potential regulation.
C. ConflictingParentalInterests

The most common legal treatment of ART concerns divorce disputes over frozen
embryos.8 6 When a couple has used IVF, successfully or unsuccessfully, they often

Supreme Court substantive due process precedent could not be used to justify a broad right to
procreate because that right must be balanced against the rights of the unborn children); Rosato,
supra note 10, at 97-98 (arguing that medically assisted procreation is not a constitutionally
protected right). But see Note, Assessing the Viability of a SubstantiveDue ProcessRight to In

Vitro Fertilization,118 HARv.L. REv. 2792, 2813 (2005) (arguing that extending substantive
due process to include a right to in vitro fertilization would be logical based on prior Supreme
Court doctrine).
80. See supra Part I for a discussion of the risks associated with ART.
81. Storrow, supra note 71, at 308-09.
82. Id.at 309-10.
83. Id.at 308-09; Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double
Bind The Illusory Choice of Motherhood,9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 53-54 (2005) (arguing

that IVF and assisted reproduction are illusory choices foisted on women who are forced to
delay childbearing until later in life so that they can fit into the male-dominated workforce);
Melissa E. Fraser, Note, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization:Controlling Women's

Reproductive Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 183, 194 (1998) (stating that IVF deepens the
reproductive inequality between men and women and furthers attempts to control women's
reproductive freedom).
84. See Storrow, supra note 71, at 328.
85. See April L. Cherry, Choosing Substantive Justice: A Discussion of "Choice,"
"Rights" and the New Reproductive Technologies, 11 Wis. WOMEN's L.J. 431,435-36 (1997).
86. KINDREGAN & McBRiEN, supra note 45, at 94-100; Helene S. Shapo, Assisted
Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 465,

465 (2006).
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choose to keep leftover frozen embryos in storage for potential future use.87 When such
a couple divorces, the partners sometimes disagree on how those embryos should be
used. Here, the courts have used different models to resolve the disputes. Most courts
have used a contract model,8 8 but when the contract is not clear, courts have ruled in
favor of the partner opposing use of the embryos for procreation. 89 This highlights a
limited vision of the procreative right: it is a right not to procreate.
ART's unregulated status has left would-be parents without guidance amid
conflicting interests. The procreative right remains largely undefined, feminists cannot
agree on the proper way to view assisted reproduction, and the only real legal guidance
exists in the disposition of frozen embryos of divorced couples. This leaves the parents
who wish to use ART with only their desires to have children and profitable fertility
clinics that are more than willing to help them in their quest. 90 This state of affairs is
unconscionable when babies are born severely harmed due to irresponsible practices on
the part of parents and their physicians. Regulation of the most risky ART practices
could prevent most of this needless pain.
IV.

PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES

The increase in premature births caused by assisted reproduction techniques is
surely a public health concern. 91 Discussion of the general public good involves
different considerations than discussion of the parental interest or the interests of the
unborn children. The costs of assisted reproduction are high, not only for treatment of
the infertile parents92 but for treatment of the children eventually born.93 These high
costs, both to individuals and to society, foster bioethical perspectives that suggest
limiting the procreative right.94 In addition, infertility treatment is often only available
to the wealthy due to high costs and lack of insurance coverage, 95 and fertility clinics

87. See Angela K. Upchurch, A PostmodernDeconstructionofFrozen Embryo Disputes,
39 CONN. L. REv. 2107, 2110-11 (2007).

88. Under a contract model, couples who divorce must abide by the terms of their embryo
storage contract. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
89. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768
(Iowa 2003).
90. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv.
1519, 1541 (1990); Hecht, supra note 11, at 261.
91. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES,
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 213 (1995). Healthcare costs of premature infants constitute "a major
financial drain" on employers who fund health insurance plans. March of Dimes, The Cost to
Business, http://www.marchofdimes.com/prematurity/21198_l 5349.asp; see also Noah, supra
note 10, at 620 (discussing the high costs of caring for infants bom as a result of ART).
92. Elizabeth Heitman, Infertilityas a PublicHealth Problem: Why AssistedReproductive
TechnologiesAre Not the Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89,95 (1995); Noah, supranote 10.
93. Noah, supra note 10; Heitman, supranote 92, at 95.
AND

94. Dillard, supra note 14, at 63 (proposing a narrow definition of the procreative right that
considers the public good).
95. See Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politicsoflnfertility: Recognizing CoverageExclusions as
Discrimination, 11 CONN. INs. L.J. 293, 300-01 (2005) (making the case that coverage
exclusions for fertility treatments should be seen as discriminatory). "Estimates for IVF range

from $8000 to $10,000 per procedure, and patients often undergo multiple procedures." Id. at
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are not limited in the types of gate-keeping practices they can employ. 96 Such barriers
to access lead to concerns of discriminatory practices by the fertility industry.
A. The High Cost of ART

The poor outcomes caused by ART result in expense and stress on the public health
system as a whole.97 Because the use of ART contributes significantly to multiple
births, 98 and because multiples are at increased risk of preterm birth and low birth
weight,99 a discussion of the public health risks of ART must include the long-term
costs of preterm birth. The March of Dimes estimates that preterm birth cost the United
States at least $26.2 billion in 2005.100 In addition, because babies born prematurely
often have low birth weight, they are at higher risk of death and disability.10' Further,
multiple-gestation pregnancies "result in substantially increased hospital charges for
both mothers and neonates" when compared with singleton pregnancies."12 And a
substantial proportion of multiple-gestation pregnancies are the result of fertility
treatments.10 3 Even singleton babies conceived through the use of ART are more likely
to be born with low birth weight, adding to the public health risks associated with
fertility treatments."14
Multiple births are associated with a host of problems for both parents and
children. 0 5 These include dramatically increased healthcare costs, use of educational
resources, and social services."' 6 When lost parental productivity and the costs of
301.
96. Storrow, supra note 15, at 2287, 2318 (arguing that minimal gate-keeping standards
should be used in fertility clinics to avoid discriminatory practices); Pendo, supra note 95, at
344 (making the case that coverage exclusions for fertility treatments should be seen as
discriminatory).
97. "Multiples are much more prone to premature birth, a situation that can produce a
whopping first-year health-care tab-more than $1billion for all low-birth-weight multiples, 35
percent of it borne by Medicare and Medicaid." Antoinette Martin, Multiple Births: A Wake-Up
Call,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at C1.
98. ART is a major cause of increasing multiple-birth rates. See supra Part I for a
discussion of ART's contribution to the risk of multiple births.
99. A leading cause of the recent increase in premature births is an increase in multiple
births. See MARCH OF DIMES, THE GROWING PROBLEM OF PREMATURrrY (2005), availableat
http://www.marchofdimes.com/files/PremFactSheetI 0-05_press-kit.pdf.
Costs,
Economic
The
Dimes,
of
100. March
http://www.marchofdimes.com/prematurity/21198_ 10734.asp.
101. Nigel S. Paneth, The Problem ofLow Birth Weight, THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring

1995, at 19, 19.
102. Tamara L. Callahan, Janet E. Hall, Susan L. Ettner, Cindy L. Christiansen, Michael F.
Greene, & William F. Crowley, The Economic Impact of Multiple-GestationPregnanciesand
the Contributionof Assisted-Reproduction Techniques to Their Incidence, 331 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 244 (1994), availableat http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/331/4/244.
103. Id.
104. See Georgina M. Chambers, Michael G. Chapman, Narelle Grayson, Marian Shanahan,
& Elizabeth A. Sullivan, Babies Born After ART Treatment Cost More Than Non-ARTBabies:
A Cost Analysis of Inpatient Birth-Admission Costs of Singleton and Multiple Gestation
Pregnancies,22 HuMAN REPROD. 3108, 3110 (2007).
105. See supra Part 1.
106. S. Petrou, T. Sach & L. Davidson, The Long-Term Costs of Preterm Birth and Low
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treating lifelong disabilities are taken into account, the costs associated with preterm
birth are astronomical. 10 7 Further, although advances in neonatal technology have
drastically reduced mortality in premature infants,108 such infants still face a significant
risk of cognitive and neurological disorders. 109 Indeed, at school age, children who
were born preterm have significantly lower cognitive test scores and face a
significantly greater risk of suffering from attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD). "0 Impairment follows these children into young adulthood."
B. Public Health Concerns Mandate Limits on the ProcreativeRight
As a public health concern, ART's high costs must be considered when determining
the scope of the procreative right. 1 2 A recently proposed, public-health-oriented
definition of the procreative right casts it narrowly: "The right to procreate, correctly
defined, is a right at least to replace oneself, and at most to procreate up to a point that
optimizes the public good."' 13 This restrictive view of procreative liberty considers the
public good
and the burden that ART-related care places on the healthcare system as a
4
whole. 1
Parents and physicians may not consider the broader impact of their drive to "cure"
infertility.1 5 Because the desire to procreate is a basic biological drive, parents who
are unable to do so without assistance often become desperate, willing to try anything
that provides a marginal chance of success."16 This desperation, combined with profitfocused fertility clinics, can have disastrous consequences. In the currently unregulated
Birth Weight: Results of a Systematic Review, 27 CHILD CARE, HEALTH & DEV. 97, 107-10

(2000).
107. One estimate puts the annual total cost of preterm birth at $50 billion. Spencer E.Ante,
Million-Dollar Babies, BUSINESS WEEK, June 23, 2008, at 46. A more modest estimate,
calculated based on hospital and medical costs for the first five years of life, is $26 billion per
year. Id.
108. Although preterm infant mortality rates have declined, prematurity is still "the leading
cause of neonatal mortality." Rebecca B. Russell, Nancy S. Green, Claudia A. Steiner, Susan
Meikle, Jennifer L. Howse, Karalee Poschman, Todd Dias, Lisa Potetz, Michael J. Davidoff,
Karla Damus & Joann R. Petrini, Cost of Hospitalizationfor Preterm and Low Birth Weight
Infants in the United States, 120 PEDIATRICS el, e2 (2007).
109. See Martin J.K. de Kleine, A. Lya den Ouden, Louis A.A. Koll~e, Anneloes van Baar,
Maria W.G. Nijhuis-van der Sanden, Adri Ilsen, Ronald Brand, & S. Pauline VerlooveVanhorick, Outcome of Perinatal Care for Very Preterm Infants at 5 Years of Age: A
Comparison Between 1983 and 1993, 21 PAEDIATRIC AND PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 26, 31
(2007).
110. Adnan T. Bhutta, Mario A. Cleves, Patrick H. Casey, Mary M. Cradock & K.J.S.
Anand, Cognitive andBehavioralOutcomes ofSchool-Aged Children Who Were Born Preterm,
288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 728, 736 (2002). Prematurity is also "associated with up to one half of
all pediatric neurodevelopmental disorders." Russell et al., supra note 108, at e2.
I11. See Karolina Lindstr6m, Birger Winbladh, Bengt Haglund & Anders Hjern, Preterm
Infants as Young Adults: A Swedish National Cohort Study, 120 PEDIATRICS 70, 76 (2007).
112. See Heitman, supra note 92, at 89 (arguing that more attention to the public health

perspective is warranted in the area of infertility).
113. Dillard, supra note 14, at 63.
114. See id.
115. See Rosato, supra note 10, at 70-71.
116. Heitman, supra note 92, at 95-96.
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realm of fertility medicine, fertility clinics are free to employ screening measures
designed to enhance profits rather than protect the welfare of their patients.
C. Currently Unregulated, Gate-keeping in Fertility Clinics FostersDiscrimination

In addition to healthcare costs, private costs to infertile parents often make the use
of ART prohibitively expensive. Patients must undergo rounds of testing and usually
take prescription drugs. One cycle of IVF alone can cost $10,000,17 and couples may
spend anywhere between $44,000 and $200,000 for a single pregnancy." 8 These
calculations often do not include the costs required to monitor high-risk pregnancies or
to treat premature newborns." 9 Most private insurers do not cover infertility
treatments, meaning that many patients must use their own resources to pay for the
expensive procedures. 20 Indeed, the high cost of fertility treatments, usually not
2
covered by health insurance, drives some couples to engage in riskier techniques.'
This state of affairs means that ART,
and especially lower-risk ART procedures, are
22
only available to wealthy patients.
The science behind ART allows its own form of gate-keeping. ART patients may
choose to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) as one possible method to
ensure that implanted embryos are free from serious genetic disorders. 23 In addition,
some patients use controversial ART procedures to assist them in choosing the gender
of their babies. 21 4 The science that makes ART possible also makes other even more
controversial techniques a possibility, such as screening for non-serious genetic
conditions or even cloning. 25 Discussion of these more controversial topics usually

117. Noah, supranote 10, at616.
118. Lori B. Andrews, Reproductive Technology Comes ofAge, 21 WHntTIER L. REV. 375,
382 (1999).
119. Heitman, supra note 92, at 95.
120. Pendo, supra note 95, at 344 (arguing that infertility treatments should be covered by
medical insurance). Some, but not all, states have enacted statutes requiring private insurers to
pay for infertility treatment. Id. at 308.
121. Amy Dockser Marcus, Fertility Clinics Try New Way to Curb Risky Multiple Births,
WALL
ST.
J.,
January
22,
2003,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/article_print/SB 1043179505382111184-.html (stating that
some couples want an "instant family" and opt for riskier techniques to avoid the costs of
repeated procedures).
122. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 45, at 263-64; Fraser, supra note 83, at 194-95.
123. EDWARDS & BRODY, supra note 16, at 521-28. See generally Rosamund Scott, Clare
Williams, Kathryn Ehrich, & Bobbie Farsides, The Appropriate Extent of Pre-Implantation
Genetic Diagnosis: Health Professionals' and Scientists' Views on the Requirement for a
"SignificantRisk of a Serious Genetic Condition", 15 MED. L. REv. 320 (2007) (discussing
PGD in general and the threshold for "serious genetic disorder").
124. J.A. Nisker & M. Jones, The Ethics of Sex Selection, in ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 41 (F. Shenfield & C. Sureau eds., 1997).
125. Guido de Wert & Joep P.M. Geraedts, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for
HereditaryDisordersthat Do Not Show a Simple MendelianPattern:An EthicalExploration,
in CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL DiLEMMAS IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 85, 95-96 (Francoise
Shenfield & Claude Sureau eds., 2006); Dolgin, supra note 9, at 103.
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emphasizes the debate over reproductive rights such as abortion, which often preempts
26
thorough consideration of the ethical issues surrounding traditional use of ART.1
The lessons learned from the early twentieth century eugenics movement can inform
discussions of limits on the procreative right.127 Gate-keeping in fertility clinics raises
concerns about possible attempts to control the genetic features of the children created.
Any such attempts could lead to discrimination.' 28 Federal law does not subject fertility
clinics to regulation, and the gate-keeping methods clinics used in screening potential
clients vary widely.129 While screening for adoptive parents is comprehensive and
rigorous,130 parents who use ART face poorly defined and inconsistent scrutiny.' 31The
most alarming aspect of the gate-keeping ability of fertility clinics is the cost of such
treatments and the ability of the fertility clinics to make their own rules about whom
they treat.' 32 The result is that often only wealthy parents are assured good ART
outcomes. 33 Inconsistent gate-keeping practices affect not just parents, but the children
eventually born. A revamped federal reporting and regulation scheme would bring
consistency to this process.
Because so many interests intersect in this consideration, regulation of ART cannot
be left to the fertility clinics (who have profit in mind) 134 or parents (who are on a
single-minded quest to reproduce). 35 Rather, the federal government must provide
consistent regulatory guidance to ensure that the interests of the children born using
ART are not neglected.
V. REGULATION OF AssISTED REPRODUCTION

Physicians and parents working alone cannot adequately safeguard children from
the risks inherent in the use of ART, and more government involvement is mandated.
Specifically, the government should provide more specific and mandatory guidelines
for responsible use of IVF and associated procedures, and the FDA should more
rigorously regulate the dosing and use of fertility drugs. This Part outlines the current
state of ART regulation in the United States (Part V.A), then discusses and critiques
some of the current scholarly proposals for regulating ART (Part V.B), and outlines
some interesting regulation techniques employed in Europe (Part V.C). Finally, Part
V.D provides recommendations for federal regulation of ART.

126. Dolgin, supra note 9, at 103; Noah, supra note 10, at 605.
127. Robertson, supra note 14, at 441.
128. Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623,
633 (1992); Storrow, supra note 15, at 2288-89 (arguing that clinics should use only clinical
gate-keeping rather than substantive judgments about the parental fitness of the prospective
parents).
129. Storrow, supra note 15, at 2288.
130. Id.
at2294.
131. Id. at2288.
132. Fraser, supra note 83, at 194-95; Heitman, supra note 92, at 93-94.
133. Daar, supra note 67, at 37-38.
134. Hecht, supra note 11, at 242-43; Rosato, supra note 10, at 71-72.
135. Rosato, supra note 10, at 70-71.
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A. ART Is Unregulatedin the United States
In 1992, Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, a
law requiring the CDC to publish a yearly report on the fertility clinics that participate
in a voluntary reporting system. 36 This yearly report must include success rates for
these fertility clinics. However, the success rates include only statistics for assisted
reproductive techniques which involve the handling of both eggs and sperm.' 37 Thus,
the CDC's definition of 42
ART includes IVF, 13 1 ICSI,'39 GIFT,'
donor eggs or embryos'

1

ZIFT, 14 1 and use of

Notably, the CDC's definition of ART does not include procedures that involve
only sperm, such as artificial insemination, 143 or only eggs, such as the use of ovulation
stimulation hormones. 4 4 As a result, the CDC report does not include success rates or
46
45
statistics on these procedures." Other sources, however, such as medical texts,1
popular fertility resources, 14 7 and legal scholars, 14 8 include ovulation stimulation and
artificial insemination in the definition of assisted reproduction. Despite the CDC's
failure to report on the use of fertility drugs, most of the ART procedures outlined in
the CDC report use these drugs to enhance their rates of success."49 Family
practitioners or standard obstetricians often prescribe this treatment 50 and are not
5
subject to the voluntary reporting requirements that apply to ART treatments.' 152'
Because the CDC's reporting system includes only a limited definition of ART,

136. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (2000).
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(a) (2000), which defines ART as "all treatments or procedures
which include the handling of human oocytes or embryos." See also CDC 2005 ART REPORT,
supra note 4, at 3 ("ART includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are
handled.").
138. See CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 4.
143. EDWARDS & BRODY, supra note 16, at 13-15 (1995).
144. Id.
145. See CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
146. EDWARDS & BRODY, supra note 16 (assisted reproduction includes ovulation
stimulation and artificial insemination).
147. Popular fertility treatment Web sites include artificial insemination and fertility drugs
among assisted reproductive treatments. See Fertility Treatment: Your Options at a Glance,
BabyCenter,
http://www.babycenter.com/0 fertility-treatment-your-options-at-a
glance_1228997.bc.
148. Noah, supranote 10.
149. Id. at 608-11.
150. Because ovulation stimulation is not included in the CDC's definition of ART, there are
no readily available statistics on the use of fertility drugs. However, all physicians can prescribe
such treatments (there are no restrictions), indicating that use of fertility drugs is probably
under-reported. Lyman, supra note 40.
151. CDC: Contribution to Multiple Births, supra note 31, at 536.
152. CDC 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
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provides only limited statistical information,' 53 and is completely voluntary,' 54 it cannot
be viewed as an adequate quality control mechanism for the ART industry. Further, the
"success rate" statistics reported by the CDC do not accurately reflect the risks inherent
155
in ART, such as eventual complications caused by premature and multiple births.
The medical community cannot continue to rely on voluntary participation in the CDC
reporting system as a viable means of regulation, despite calls by medical ethicists for
156
physicians to bear more responsibility for ART outcomes.
Some states have laws affecting assisted reproduction. However, these laws are not
comprehensive, and "[m]ost regulation of assisted reproduction at the state level seems
focused on particular methods, such as sperm donation, surrogacy, human reproductive
cloning, or embryo donation."'5 Even among the few states that have enacted statutes
directly regulating the fertility industry, there is no law requiring that fertility clinics
conduct their practices in a way to avoid harm to the future children.' 58 ART's "wild
west" status is particularly evident when a review of a local fertility clinic Web site
proclaims proudly on its banner: "Expect a Miracle!"' 159 Despite examples of such
advertising that might give false hope to infertility patients, some insist that the
industry can police itself.160 Nonetheless, many scholars and at least one federal
government panel agree on the necessity of further federal regulation of ART.161
B. Governmental and Scholarly Proposalsfor ART RegulationDo Not Go Far
Enough
The President's Council on Bioethics issued its recommendations for ART,
including continued industry self-regulation and federally funded longitudinal
studies. 162 Unfortunately, these recommendations do not go far enough to avoid the
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state regulatory regimes).
158. Noah, supra note 10, at 648; Hecht, supra note 11, at 228.
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(2002),
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ART); Michael J. Malinowski, A Law-Policy Proposalto Know Where Babies Come From
During the Reproduction Revolution, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 549, 568 (2006) (proposing a
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heartbreaking and physically devastating outcomes of unprincipled uses of ART. In
addition, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, a so-called "selfregulating" group of physicians, issued guidelines for the number of embryos
transferred. These guidelines, which are completely voluntary and allow for physicians
and their patients to make their own determinations within
or outside the guidelines,
63
recommend limiting the number of embryos transferred.
There are currently two proposed model acts governing ART. The first, the Model
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, is an attempt to propose regulations (including
licensing requirements for clinics) on the use ofART.' 64 This proposed regulation does
not go far enough, however, as it fails to mention limits or safeguards to prevent or
limit multiple births. 165 The most recent proposed model act was put forth by the
American Bar Association (ABA). 66 The ABA Model Act's proposed regulations
focus on such issues as collaborative reproduction,' 67 informed consent,1 68 and
disposition of frozen embryos. 69 Because the ABA Model Act does not mention ways
to limit multiple births, it does not address the issues raised by this Note. Any future
regulation of assisted reproduction must take into account the grave risks and societal
costs of needlessly creating multifetal pregnancies.
Finally, Professor Rosato has proposed a "double-decker" approach to regulation
that would similarly fall short of the need to protect the children eventually born from
ART.170 Her proposal includes continued state regulation with some federal
oversight.' 71 Although her call for a "bright-line" rule limiting the number of multiple
births is a good one, it is unclear how continued state regulation could accomplish this
goal.172 Comprehensive federal regulation, involving agencies such as the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), is needed. Her approach for limiting the number of
embryos transferred to three is likewise unlikely to stem the tide of multiples born as a
result of IVF.173 The number should be limited even further for younger women who
have a good chance of becoming pregnant with one embryo transferred. 74 Further, her
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164. Sara Cotton, Sara Hill, Anna F. Hirstein, Jessica L. James, Alissa D. Klein, Elizabeth A.
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Model Assisted Reproductive Technology Act: Examining the Legal,EthicalandMedicalIssues
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proposal to limit the number of multiples born from the use of ovulation stimulation
hormones is too modest (requiring physicians to report triplet and higher-order
multiples born and then "investigating" them).175 It is possible that these drugs should
be banned altogether or their use strictly limited by the FDA.176 Mere reporting and
investigation will not suffice.

C. European Models Can Provide Guidance for the Regulation ofART in the
United States
77
European models demonstrate that comprehensive regulation of ART is possible.1
In the United Kingdom, for example, an independent government agency (the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)) grants licenses for all types of
fertility treatment and research. 178 The HFEA has broad discretion to set the conditions
for licensing and provides guidelines for practice.' 79 These guidelines include limits on
the number of embryos that can be transferred during IVF.180 Similarly, in France, the
Ministry of Health grants licenses to physicians to practice reproductive medicine.81

Belgium has managed to simultaneously address the problem of ART-associated
multiple births and lack of access to fertility treatments. In 2002 the Belgian
government instituted a policy to provide national health insurance coverage for
fertility treatments.' 82 The country proposed to cover the additional costs of covering
fertility treatments by making a concerted effort to reduce multiple births, thus
reducing overall healthcare costs. 183 The first prong of this strategy has been
successful: multiple births as a result of IVF have been reduced. 848 The next prong is to
reduce multiple births associated with the use of fertility drugs. 1
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D. Recommendationsfor Regulation of ART
Although U.S. physicians would surely oppose licensing requirements for clinical
practice, 186 the HFEA's guidelines and the Belgian project might be instructive as a
model for U.S. regulatory requirements. As a primary matter, regulation should include
limits on the numbers of embryos transferred during IVF,GIFT, and ZIFT. Guidelines
limiting the number of embryos transferred during these procedures should be
mandatory.
Finally, a principled regulatory framework must include guidelines for fertility drug
use. The risks associated with the use of fertility drugs are so serious, in fact, that at
least one legal scholar has called for the FDA to restrict or withdraw its approval for
their use. 8 7 Perhaps the FDA could get involved, providing adverse event reporting on
multiple pregnancies and reevaluating the approval of these drugs. Notably, even the
voluntary reporting framework created by the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992 does not include any provisions for reporting on the use of
fertility drugs.1 88 Use of these drugs carries serious risks, 189 and any proposed
regulation of assisted reproduction must consider these serious risks and attempt to
promote only responsible use of these drugs. That the 1992 Act excluded use of
fertility drugs from its definition of ART is unfortunate for the people who are
adversely affected by their use.' 90 One such proposal for responsible use of fertility
drugs includes, at the very least, "discourage[ing] aggressive ovarian stimulation in
favor of either intrauterine insemination alone or in vitro fertilization with the transfer
of no more than one or two embryos at one time."' 9' In addition, conservative 9use
of
2
ovarian stimulating drugs lessens the risk of high-order multiple pregnancies.
Putting these simple safeguards into place would allow parents and physicians the
freedom they need to pursue parenthood without burdening the children eventually
bom. Those children should not be forced to suffer the consequences of poor decision
making on the part of parents and physicians.
CONCLUSION

Assisted Reproductive Technology has flourished unregulated in the United States.
Despite its unregulated status, ART is hardly a routine area of medicine that impacts
only the immediate patient. Rather, availability and use of ART has the potential to
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profoundly impact the lives of parents, the children born from its use, and the
healthcare system as a whole. The children have not had a voice in the debate.
It should be noted that any discussion of regulation ofART also raises the specter of
regulation of other reproductive rights, such as abortion. 93 However, regulation of
ART need not implicate the right to abortion. In consciously choosing to undergo
invasive medical procedures to overcome their natural infertility, parents who use ART
and the physicians who assist them undertake a grave responsibility--the responsibility
to behave ethically and to safely bring a healthy child into the world. The simple
safeguards that this Note recommends would greatly reduce the likelihood of injury to
the children eventually born.
There are many barriers to the regulation of ART. In particular, even scholarly
treatment of the issues associated with ART is sometimes blinded by emotion. 194 Any
regulation of ART must take into account the interests of the future children. In doing
so, it must restrict the use of practices which increase the risk for multiple births while
preserving reproductive freedom for the would-be parents. Regulation to promote these
goals would be relatively easy to implement and would not unduly burden the
procreative liberty of the parents.

193. Cf. Dolgin, supra note 9, at 101-03.
194. For example, Lori B. Andrews and Lisa Douglass proclaim that "[i]n developing a
framework for policy in this area, we need to go beyond emotional responses." Andrews &
Douglass, supra note 128, at 625 (1992). Three pages later in the same article, however, they
plead that "it seems unfair to demand that the infertile provide greater justification for their
desire to reproduce than we require of the fertile population." Id. at 628.

